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Quality Design and Environmental Implications of
Green Consumerism in Remanufacturing
ABSTRACT
We study quality design and the environmental consequences of green consumerism in a remanufacturing con-
text. Specifically, a firm has the option to design a non-remanufacturable or a remanufacturable product and
to specify a corresponding quality, and the design choices affect both the production costs and consumer valua-
tions associated with the product. On the cost side, remanufacturable products cost more to produce originally,
but less to remanufacture, than non-remanufacturable products cost to produce. Analogously, on the con-
sumer side, remanufacturable products are valued more, but remanufactured products are valued less, than
non-remanufacturable products are valued. Given this, we investigate the environmental consequences of de-
signing for remanufacturability by first defining a measure of environmental impact that ultimately is a function
of what is produced and how much is produced, and then applying that measure to assess the environmental
impact associated with the firm’s optimal strategy relative to the environmental impact associated with the
firm’s otherwise optimal strategy if a non-remanufacturable product were designed and produced.
Keywords: Product Design; Quality; Remanufacturing; Environmental Friendliness; Green Consumerism
1 INTRODUCTION
“Green” has become a buzzword that penetrates daily life. Among consumers, in particular, there
is a growing trend to incorporate socially responsible considerations into purchasing decisions and
to buy eco-friendly products accordingly (Layton, 2008; Grekova et al., 2014; Eurobarometer, 2008,
2009). This trend is referred to as “green consumerism” and is conceptualized as ‘a personal ethical
orientation or as a set of pro-environmental personal values and attitudes that inform a particular form
of socially conscious or socially responsible decision making’ (Moisander and Pesonen, 2002, pp.329).
Basically, green consumers are those who are willing to trade-off, to varying degrees, conventional
economic attributes of a product, such as price and quality, for example, for environmentally friendly
features. Indeed, a significant portion of consumers even are willing to pay a premium for products with
these features. Based on their recent meta-analysis of approximately 80 empirical studies published or
presented between 1996 and 2012, for example, Tully and Winer (2014) conclude that upwards of 60%
of respondents are willing to pay such a premium and that, on average, the premium that consumers
are willing to pay is 16.8%. Thus, the green segment is becoming increasingly important to firms.
Recognizing these shifts in the marketplace, firms understandably are redesigning products to in-
clude features that would appeal to green consumers. Remanufacturing is an example of a process
that creates such appeal. Remanufacturable products are generally considered to be not only environ-
mentally friendly because they lead to reduced waste by encouraging practices such as reverse logistics
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(Guide, 2000; Lai et al., 2013), but also profitable because they translate into lower production costs
(Caterpillar Press Release, 2005; Lebreton and Tuma, 2006; Robotis et al., 2012; Sabharwal and Garg,
2013). Nevertheless, whereas the economic benefits of remanufacturing have been studied extensively,
the environmental implications remain unclear. One possible reason for this ambiguity stems from
reports that firms proliferated across many industries are guilty of greenwashing in the sense that they
ride the wave of green consumerism without necessarily considering whether or not their actions actu-
ally benefit the environment (Orange, 2010). Thus, the interplay of how remanufacturability, on the
one hand, and green consumerism, on the other hand, affect the environment requires more rigorous
examination.
In this paper, we study a firm’s quality design problem in a remanufacturing context given that
the firm’s market is defined by green consumers. More importantly, we examine the environmental
consequences associated with the resulting optimal design. In particular, we investigate the conditions
under which a firm designs its products to be remanufacturable. Accordingly, we develop a model to
characterize the firm’s optimal product portfolio of new and remanufactured products, and establish
the corresponding optimal product design decisions. Then, we assess the environmental impact of these
results. Consequently, we ascertain the extent to which profitability and environmental friendliness are
complementary, and in doing so, we identify key drivers that would make remanufacturing practices
more environmentally friendly.
We approach these issues by modeling a firm’s quality design and remanufacturing decisions when
consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for product quality. On the product design
front, the firm must choose to design either a non-remanufacturable product or a remanufacturable
product; and the firm must also specify the corresponding product quality, which we define as a
single dimensional vertical characteristic as in Moorthy (1984). These design choices impact both
the manufacturer’s cost structure and consumers’ valuations of the product. On the cost side, a
remanufacturable product costs more to produce originally, but less to remanufacture, as compared
to the cost of producing a non-remanufacturable product (Debo et al., 2005, 2006). On the consumer
side, a remanufacturable product is valued more by consumers (Tully and Winer, 2014; Sengupta,
2011; Harris Interactive, 2013), as compared to the valuation of a non-remanufacturable product, but
a remanufactured one is valued less (Guide and Li, 2010; Michaud and Llerena, 2011). The firm thus
must consider these trade-offs and optimally choose the design and corresponding quality and price.
Note that our model therefore applies to cases in which remanufacturability is an upfront decision
made as part of the design process, which is true for many firms; although firms sometimes choose to
remanufacture some of their product lines well after product introduction, such a case is beyond the
scope of our study.
To operationalize our problem of quality design for a green market with a parsimonious model
that captures remanufacturing fundamentals, we follow the lead of Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006)
and Atasu et al. (2008) by formulating a two-stage analytic framework. At the beginning of stage 1,
the firm first determines whether to design a remanufacturable product or a non-remanufacturable
product and, correspondingly, establishes the quality of the chosen product. Then the firm sets the
selling price for the product and sells an amount accordingly, as dictated by the specified consumer
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market’s heterogeneity. Finally, to conclude stage 1, consumers who purchase the product extract its
consumption value and then either discard the remains (which is the case if the product was designed
to be non-remanufacturable) or return the remains (which is the case if the product was designed to
be remanufacturable). The amount of re-collected remains, if applicable, thus establishes a supply
constraint on the number of units that can be remanufactured for resale. Given that, at the beginning
of stage 2, the firm’s decision is to set its optimal product portfolio, that is, to determine how many
units of new versus remanufactured products to produce and what associated prices to set accordingly
for sale of each product type in stage 2.
By jointly studying quality design for a green market and product design for remanufacturability
to assess and evaluate the associated environmental consequences, our model offers two benefits that
constitute its primary contribution. The first benefit of our model is the incorporation of product
quality as a vertical attribute in a remanufacturing context. Specifically, we formulate our model
by explicitly building not only the firm’s cost structure but also consumers’ valuation preferences
on quality. As a result, we find that, everything else being equal, the firm would couple increased
remanufacturing with higher product quality. This mirrors empirical evidence that not only suggests
a strong link between product quality and environmental performance (e.g., Wiengarten and Pagell,
2012; Oakley, 1993), but also suggests that consumers are interested in environmental performance
and quality as interrelated dimensions of their willingness to pay (Jaffry et al., 2004). In addition, we
find that product quality provides a demand lever for manipulating the product mix of new versus
remanufactured products offered in stage 2. For example, if demand is not affected by quality, then
the firm could reap the cost benefits of remanufacturing in stage 2 only by increasing sales of new
products in stage 1 through lowering price (Yalabik et al., 2013). However, with quality dependent
demand, the firm would decrease new products sales and increase product quality instead, and in
doing so, the firm could charge a higher profit margin from each product without lowering price.
The second benefit of our model is the explicit inclusion of the notion of environmental impact,
a quality-dependent analytical measure, to quantitatively capture the environmental consequences
of designing for remanufacturability. This environmental measure provides a mechanism to assess
the ecological footprint of product design and quality in a remanufacturing context. Specifically,
our measure represents the total resources acquired from, and wastes discarded to, the environment
during the planning horizon. Moreover, this measure is robust in the sense that various weights can
be assigned to the different stages of the product life cycle without altering the insights. Perhaps most
notable among these insights is that environmental impact could increase significantly if consumers
are green to the extent that they value the idea that a product can be remanufactured but not to the
extent that they also value the fact that the product has been remanufactured. This subtle distinction
can be particularly detrimental to the environment if consumers value remanufacturable products on
the one hand, but significantly devalue remanufactured products on the other hand. Given strong
empirical evidence that environmentally friendly products are favored by consumers (e.g., Yoo and
Kwak, 2009; Davis et al., 1995; Laroche et al., 2001) while remanufactured products are perceived as
lower quality (e.g., Michaud and Llerena, 2011; Hazen et al., 2012), this somewhat counterintuitive
result suggests that environmental friendliness is not necessarily a synonym for remanufacturing, and it
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reinforces the idea that consumption rather than production, per se, is the enemy of the environment.
Thus, to paraphrase Orange (2010), the first step to a better environment is to reduce, not to recycle
or to reuse.
In a similar vein, we also find that a lower production cost or a higher remanufacturing cost saving
may not necessarily benefit the environment, despite increasing profit for the firm. Intuitively, a lower
production cost (for new products) attracts the firm to increase the volume of new products, which
thereby consumes more virgin resources and results in more discarded waste. Similarly, a higher cost
saving from remanufacturing attracts the firm to design higher product quality, which again ultimately
results in a more negative impact to the environment. This result is an example of Jevons paradox
(Alcott, 2005). As such, it echoes discussions, many in industry journals, that warn against wholesale
adoption of practices such as remanufacturing and recycling without considering industry dynamics
and product properties (e.g., Volokh and Scarlett, 1997; Reich, 2004; Griff, 2003) by suggesting that
it is in the interest of the environment for production technologies not to be too cost efficient.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2, we review the literature and position
our paper accordingly. In §3, we specify and discuss our model primitives, and we formulate and
solve the firm’s resulting profit maximization problem by mapping out and cataloging different quality
design and remanufacturing strategies, we compare the different strategies to determine the firm’s
optimal decisions, and we explore implications accordingly. Section 4 defines the measure that we use
to evaluate the impact on the environment resulting from the firm’s optimal strategy. We discuss the
scope and applicability of our model in §5, and we conclude the paper in §6. Proofs of propositions
appear in Appendix.
2 RELATION TO LITERATURE
Our research relates to two streams of literature. The first stream is the literature on product design
and segmentation, which we trace to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and to Moorthy (1984). See also Yayla-
Kullu et al. (2011) and the references therein. This stream studies the optimal quality and pricing
decisions of a product line that is differentiated by quality when serving consumers heterogeneous
in their willingness to pay. Results indicate that a low-quality product cannibalizes the sales of a
high-quality product and, as a result, the firm responds by increasing the differentiation between
the high- and low-quality products. Our problem is similar to this product line problem in that
the new and remanufactured products in our model can be considered as the high- and low-quality
products in the product line problem. However, our problem is also different from the product line
problem in two respects. The first difference is the presence of remanufacturing supply constraint that
restricts the number of remanufactured products to be no greater than the number of re-collected
used products available. The second difference is that the consumer perception of quality of the two
products is not the same. In our remanufacturing setting, both products have the same quality level.
Thus, differentiation between products is due to the fact that consumers discount their valuation of
remanufactured products because these products were used previous to being remanufactured.
The second stream is the literature on remanufacturing. Within this realm, there are two different
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foci. One focus is defined primarily by operational concerns. This focus typically assumes price,
demand, and remanufacturability to be exogenous, and generally applies to issues such as logistics,
production planning, and inventory control (Fleischmann et al., 1997; Toktay et al., 2000; Ferguson
et al., 2011; Bulmus¸ et al., 2013; Hsueh, 2011; Vercraene et al., 2014). The other focus is defined
primarily by pricing or remanufacturability concerns and generally applies to such issues as market
segmentation or growth (Debo et al., 2005, 2006; Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2006; Atasu et al., 2008;
Atasu and Souza, 2011; Xiong et al., 2014) and competition (Majumder and Groenevelt, 2001; Ferrer
and Swaminathan, 2006, 2010; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Mitra and Webster, 2008; Kleber et al.,
2011; Choi et al., 2013). This focus typically models rich interactions between price and quantity
trade-offs. In particular, on the one hand, the firm has incentive to lower the first-stage new product
price to boost sales in order to achieve cost savings realized by selling remanufactured products in the
second stage. However, on the other hand, such remanufacturing would cannibalize new product sales
in the second stage, thus creating a disincentive for remanufacturing. Considering these trade-offs,
Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) analyze competition between an OEM and a local firm. They find
that a social planner should provide incentives to the OEM to increase remanufacturing. Debo et al.
(2005) study segmentation and remanufacturability in an infinite-horizon setting and find that both
fixed and variable costs affect remanufacturing in a negative way. Debo et al. (2006) similarly study life-
cycle dynamics of new and remanufactured products; they find that the interplay between the diffusion
rate and the likelihood of repeat purchases is a fundamental driver for investing in remanufacturing
capacity. Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006, 2010) study both finite-horizon and infinite-horizon problems
in a competition setting and conclude that remanufacturing decisions become stable after initial states.
Ferguson and Toktay (2006) investigate remanufacturing as a strategy to deter market entry. Common
to these models is the assumption that both new and remanufactured products are indistinguishable
or that remanufactured products are discounted relative to new products. None of these models,
however, define product quality as a vertical attribute that affects demand. In contrast, our model
includes product quality as a decision in addition to price that affects demand.
More recently, Atasu and Souza (2011) study a firm’s quality choice with regards to different types
of product recovery. They find that while product recovery generally increases the firm’s profitability,
different forms of product recovery impact the environment differently. In particular, they find that
although remanufacturing is a product recovery strategy that provides environmental benefits, recy-
cling is a product recovery strategy that can contribute to environmental damage. As such, Atasu and
Souza (2011) is particularly instrumental to our work because it provides the inspiration and basis for
both the product-design cost function as well as the analytical measure of environmental damage that
we adopt, but our work differs from theirs in three important respects. First, we use a two-stage model
to capture the trade-off between current and future profits. Second, we incorporate the notion that
green consumers are willing to pay more for products that can be remanufactured upon return than
they are for products that cannot be remanufactured, everything else being equal. This assumption
is consistent with the evidence suggesting that consumers are willing to pay a premium for products
with green features (Tully and Winer, 2014; Harris Interactive, 2013), given the stipulation that re-
manufacturability constitutes one such green feature. We make this stipulation because of indirect
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support in the form of industry initiatives that identify organizations with established recycling activi-
ties and that encourage consumers to patron those organizations (such as, for example, the Electronics
Takeback Coalition (http://www.electronicstakeback.com, 2014)). We note, however, that the ex-
tent to which consumers can observe remanufacturability and the extent to which they are willing
to pay premiums for this specific feature may vary from one product to another. Third, we consider
remanufacturable products more costly to produce than non-remanufacturable ones. This assumption
is consistent with Debo et al. (2005, 2006) and reflects the intuition that advanced components (i.e.,
components more durable than the original item) might be required in such circumstances.
In addition to these modeling-focused research streams, remanufacturing has been investigated
empirically as well. The empirical remanufacturing literature can be roughly split into three categories
relevant to this paper. First, consumer perceptions of remanufactured products (e.g., Hazen et al.,
2012) and green consumerism (e.g., Prothero, 1990) have been investigated widely, the former in the
operations management literature, and the latter in the marketing and psychology literatures. These
literatures, in particular, describe the impacts and drivers of green consumerism, that is the notion
that consumers, all else being equal, will prefer environmentally friendly products. Although the exact
motivations behind the phenomenon are beyond our scope, the resulting behavior is explicitly built into
our model. The second stream of empirical research relevant to this work is that which investigates
the barriers to the adoption of remanufacturing (e.g., Besch, 2005) and closed-loop systems (e.g.,
Miemczyk, 2008). This body of literature looks at both the institutional and market limitations to
operating systems such as those supporting remanufacturing. Thus, our work both feeds off of and
contributes to this literature. Finally, there is a body of literature that investigates the impact of
environmentally friendly practices on profits (e.g., Ageron et al., 2012; Gimenez et al, 2012; Wong
et al., 2012), which we contribute to by identifying the conditions under which remanufacturing is
profitable, regardless of whether or not it is environmentally friendly.
3 THE MODEL
We specify the modeling assumptions that define the firm, the consumers, and the decision making
framework in §3.1. Then we develop and conditionally solve the firm’s design for remanufacturing
problem based first on the stipulation that the firm does not remanufacture any products in stage 2
(§3.2) and subsequently on the stipulation that the firm does remanufacture products in stage 2 (§3.3).
We compare the results in §3.2 and §3.3 to develop the optimal quality design in §3.4.
3.1 Modeling Assumptions
The Firm. We define the firm as a profit maximizer that can both manufacture new products and
remanufacture used ones. The firm makes design choices concerning product quality and remanufac-
turability. We model product quality, denoted by q, as a one-dimensional vertical measure representing
all the components/attributes that consumers prefer. We model remanufacturability, denoted by k,
such that k = 0 represents a non-remanufacturable product and k = 1 represents a remanufacturable
product. Once determined, the product design cannot be changed. Moreover, a remanufacturable
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product can be remanufactured at most once.
Given product quality q and remanufacturability k, the firm incurs a variable cost for each unit of
its product produced1. Consistent with the product design literature, the variable cost of production is
quadratic in quality, but the magnitude of this variable cost depends on whether the unit produced is
a new non-remanufacturable product, a new remanufacturable product, or a remanufactured product.
Specifically, we use q2 to model the variable cost per unit to produce a new non-remanufacturable
product of quality q, we use (1 + c1)q
2 to model the per unit variable cost to produce a new reman-
ufacturable product (i.e., we use c1q
2 to denote the cost premium associated with producing a new
remanufacturable unit over producing a new non-remanufacturable unit), and we use (1 − c2)q2 to
model the per unit variable cost to produce a remanufactured product (i.e., we use c2q
2 to denote the
cost savings associated with remanufacturing a used unit over producing a new non-remanufacturable
unit). Note that c1 ≥ 0, which means that producing a new product that can be remanufactured
is (weakly) more expensive than producing a new product that cannot be remanufactured, and that
0 ≤ c2 ≤ 1, which means that remanufacturing a used product is (weakly) less expensive than manu-
facturing a new product. Our assumptions are consistent with Debo et al. (2005, 2006).
Given this construct, to facilitate our presentation, we denote gn(k) = 1 + c1k for k = 0, 1 as the
production cost coefficient associated with a new product, which depends on whether or not the new
product is remanufacturable, and we denote gr = 1− c2 as the remanufacturing cost coefficient, which
applies only when k = 1. Please see Table 1 below for a summary of this nomenclature.
Consumers. We model heterogenous green consumerism where consumers differ vertically in their
willingness to pay, and they differentiate whether a product is new and non-remanufacturable, new and
remanufacturable, or used but remanufactured. Specifically, we model consumers’ valuation for a new
non-remanufacturable product of quality q as vq, where v follows a uniform distribution along [0, 1]2.
Comparatively, we model consumers’ valuation for a new remanufacturable product of quality q as
(1 + θ)vq (i.e., we use θvq to denote consumers’ valuation premium associated with purchasing a new
remanufacturable product over a new non-remanufacturable one), and we model consumers’ valuation
for a remanufactured product as (1−α)vq (i.e., we use αvq to denote the valuation discount associated
with purchasing a remanufactured product over a new non-remanufacturable one). Consistent with
Tully and Winer (2014) and Harris Interactive (2013), we define θ ≥ 0 to mean that consumers in a
green market value a new product that can be remanufactured (weakly) more than one that cannot
be remanufactured; and, consistent with Atasu et al. (2008) and Guide and Li (2010), we define
α ≥ 0 to mean that consumers in a green market nevertheless value a used product that has been
remanufactured (weakly) less than a new one. Analogous to gn(k) and gr, we denote fn(k) = 1 + θk
for k = 0, 1 and fr = 1 − α to facilitate our presentation. Please see Table 1 for a summary of this
nomenclature.
Consistent with similar derivations in Ferguson and Toktay (2006) and Ferrer and Swaminathan
1Although in some remanufacturing models the firm incurs a fixed cost associated with developing and choosing
production technology, we adopt the convention of Atasu et al. (2008) and normalize this fixed cost to zero. However,
incorporating a fixed cost such as this in our model is straightforward.
2In this paper, we assume a uniform distribution for consumer valuation of quality for several reasons: 1) it allows us
to focus on the cannibalization between new and remanufactured products; 2) it enables us to derive closed form results;
3) it is a standard assumption in the quality design literature.
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Table 1: Model parameters definition
Notation Definition Range References
fn(k) 1 + θk ≥ 1 Tully and Winer (2014); Harris Interactive (2013)
fr 1− α (0, 1] Atasu et al. (2008); Guide and Li (2010)
gn(k) 1 + c1k ≥ 1 Debo et al. (2005, 2006)
gr 1− c2 (0, 1) Debo et al. (2005, 2006)
(2006), we assume that consumers purchase to maximize their non-negative surplus, which is defined
by the difference between valuation and price paid. Let pn and pr be the price of a new and a
remanufactured product, respectively. Then, the surplus derived by a consumer of type v from buying
a new and a remanufactured product characterized by q and k is fn(k)vq−pn and frvq−pr, respectively.
If only new products are available, then consumers choose to purchase the new product if fn(k)vq−pn ≥
0. If both new and remanufactured products are available, then consumers choose the new product
over the remanufactured one if fn(k)vq − pn ≥ frvq − pr and vice versa, but if consumers cannot
derive nonnegative surplus from either product then they will remain inactive (i.e., they will purchase
neither product), which occurs for consumers with low valuation as shown in Figure 1.
In the first stage, only new products can be sold regardless of product design. Thus the demand
for new products in the first stage, dn1, is
dn1 = 1− pn1
fn(k)q
(1)
where pn1 is the new product price in the first stage, q is the quality, and k = 0, 1 is the remanufac-
turability. If the product is designed to be non-remanufacturable (i.e., if k = 0), then in the second
stage, again only new products can be sold. In this case, the corresponding second stage demand is
similar to (1): dn2 = 1 − pn2fn(0)q , where pn2 is the second stage new-product price. If the product is
designed to be remanufacturable (i.e., if k = 1), then in the second stage the firm must choose whether
or not to remanufacture. If the firm chooses not to remanufacture any units in the second stage, then
only new products can be sold and the corresponding demand is again similar to (1). In contrast, if
the firm chooses to remanufacture, then a fraction of consumers purchase new products, a fraction of
consumers purchase remanufactured products, and the remainder of consumers purchase no products3.
3Given that α ≥ 0 by assumption, consumers who buy new products have higher v than those who buy remanufactured
One Product
Demand Model
v︷ ︸︸ ︷dn1
Two Products
Demand Model
v︷ ︸︸ ︷dr2 ︷ ︸︸ ︷dn2
0 1
0 1
Inactive
Inactive
Figure 1: Heterogeneous consumers
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In this case, the corresponding second stage demands for new and remanufactured products, dn2 and
dr2, respectively, are
dn2 = 1− pn2 − pr2
(fn(1)− fr)q , and
dr2 =
pn2 − pr2
(fn(1)− fr)q −
pr2
frq
(2)
where pr2 is the remanufactured product price in the second stage.
The Decision Framework. Consistent with the related remanufacturing literature (Majumder
and Groenevelt, 2001; Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2006; Ray et al., 2005; Atasu et al., 2008), we use
a two-stage model to formulate the firm’s design for remanufacturing problem. At the beginning
of stage 1, the firm first chooses its product quality and remanufacturability. Then the firm sets a
corresponding selling price and produces only new products. At the end of stage 1, these units either
are discarded (which is the case if k = 0) or are re-collected after use (which is the case if k = 1)4.
Finally, in stage 2, the firm sets the prices for new and (or) remanufactured products and produces
the corresponding quantities subject to the remanufacturing supply constraint imposed by the new
product sales in the first stage.
Given this, we next develop and solve the firm’s profit maximization problem for given quality
q to establish a strategy space for product quality that depends on whether or not remanufacturing
takes place. We first investigate the case in which there is no remanufacturing (i.e., the case in which
dr2 = 0). We refer to this case as the Non-Remanufacturing strategy. Then we study the case in which
there is remanufacturing (i.e., the case in which dr2 > 0). We refer to this case as the Remanufacturing
strategy. Later, in §3.4, we compare the profit of the optimal Remanufacturing strategy to that of the
optimal Non-Remanufacturing strategy to establish conditions indicating when it is optimal to design
a remanufacturable product for the green market.
3.2 Non-Remanufacturing Strategy
We define the Non-Remanufacturing strategy as one in which only new products are sold in each
period. In other words, by definition of this strategy, dr2 = 0. Nevertheless, at the design stage, two
substrategies exist: either design the product to be non-remanufacturable (k = 0), which we refer to
as the Baseline substrategy (B); or design the product to be remanufacturable (k = 1), which we refer
to as the Premium substrategy (M). In either substrategy, the demand function is the same for both
stage 1 and stage 2 and is given by (1). Accordingly, if the firm implements the Non-Remanufacturing
strategy, then pn1 = pn2 = p and the total profit for the two stages is
ΠNR(p, q, k) = 2
(
1− p
fn(k)q
)
(p− gn(k)q2), (3)
ones. This is depicted in Figure 1, which illustrates that dn2 is to the right of dr2.
4Throughout our analysis, we implicitly assume 100% collection rate for the remanufacturable products at the end
of stage 1 and, similar to Atasu et al. (2008), we assume that the collection cost is linear in the quantity collected and
is included in the production cost gnq
2. For the case in which the collection rate is less than 100%, our results are not
significantly altered as long as the collection rate is not too small.
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which is concave in p for given quality q and remanufacturability k. Optimizing (3) over p for given q
and k, we have p(q, k) = (fn(k)+gn(k)q)q2 . Substituting this for p in (3), the resulting profit written as a
function of q and k, is
ΠNR(q, k) =
q(fn(k)− gn(k)q)2
2fn(k)
. (4)
Let qNR(k) denote the optimal product quality as a function of k given that the Non-Remanufacturing
strategy is implemented. Then, optimizing (4) over q yields qNR(k) = fn(k)3gn(k) for k = 0, 1. This, from
(4), implies that
ΠNR(k) ≡ ΠNR(qNR(k), k) = 2fn(k)
2
27gn(k)
=
{
2
27 , if k = 0;
2(1+θ)2
27(1+c1)
, if k = 1.
(5)
Given (5), let ΠB ≡ ΠNR(k = 0) denote the firm’s profit if the Baseline substrategy is implemented,
and let ΠM ≡ ΠNR(k = 1) denote the firm’s profit if the Premium substrategy is implemented. Then,
comparing ΠB to ΠM leads directly to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Non-Remanufacturing Strategy). Let (kNR∗, qNR∗, pNR∗) denote the optimal
design and pricing decisions, given that dr2 = 0; and let d
NR∗ and ΠNR∗ denote the associated two-
stage total demand and profit, respectively. Then, the Premium substrategy is optimal (i.e., kNR∗ = 1)
if and only if 1 + c1 < (1 + θ)
2. Accordingly,
kNR∗ qNR∗ pNR∗ dNR∗ ΠNR∗
1 + c1 < (1 + θ)
2 1 qM = (1+θ)3(1+c1)
2(1+θ)2
9(1+c1)
2
3 Π
M = 2(1+θ)
2
27(1+c1)
1 + c1 ≥ (1 + θ)2 0 qB = 13 29 23 ΠB = 227
Recall that 1 + θ represents a consumer’s valuation coefficient for a remanufacturable product and
that 1 + c1 represents the corresponding cost coefficient for the remanufacturable product. Thus, in
essence, Proposition 1 indicates that if the marginal valuation for a remanufacturable product justifies
the marginal cost of producing the product, then designing for remanufacturing is justified even if
no units are actually remanufactured subsequently. In other words, even without remanufacturing, it
could be in the firm’s interest to design a remanufacturable product if that is what consumers value.
This suggests that the valuation premium θ is more representative of the halo effect of green con-
sumerism, or the willingness to pay for the idealistic promise of a green world, than it is representative
of actual greenness, per se (Layton, 2008). In this sense, θ is akin to consumers “talking a green talk”,
but it is not indicative of whether or not consumers are willing to follow through by actually “walking
a green walk”.
3.3 Remanufacturing Strategy
We define the Remanufacturing strategy as one in which remanufactured products are sold in the sec-
ond stage. In other words, by definition of this strategy, dr2 > 0. Given this strategy, the firm designs
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the new product to be remanufacturable (i.e., k = 1). In stage 2, then, the firm optimally determines
the product portfolio of new and remanufactured products knowing that the remanufactured products
will cannibalize the demand for new products. We therefore categorize the Remanufacturing strategy
into two substrategies depending on the firm’s level of remanufacturing in stage 2 given that all used
units are returned at the end of stage 1. If all returned used products are remanufactured (i.e., if
dn1 = dr2 > 0), then we say the firm implements the Complete Remanufacturing (CR) substrategy.
If fewer than all returned used products are remanufactured (i.e., if dn1 > dr2 > 0), then we say the
firm implements the Partial Remanufacturing (PR) substrategy. In either of these substrategies, the
demand functions for stage 1 and stage 2 are given by (1) and (2), respectively. Accordingly, if the
firm implements the Remanufacturing strategy, then the total profit for the two stages is
ΠR(pn1, pn2, pr2, q) = dn1(pn1 − gnq2) + dn2(pn2 − gnq2) + dr2(pr2 − grq2) (6)
where k = 1 by definition, and fn ≡ fn(1) = 1 + θ and gn ≡ gn(1) = 1 + c1. Given (6), note
that the Remanufacturing strategy would be implemented only if gr/fr < gn/fn because, otherwise,
the Remanufacturing strategy would be dominated by the Non-Remanufacturing strategy of Section
3.2. (Please see Lemma 1 in Appendix for details.) Thus, in mapping out the Remanufacturing
strategy, we implicitly assume that gr/fr < gn/fn to ensure that dr2 > 0. Optimizing (6) for given q,
subject to the supply constraint dr2 ≤ dn1, thus yields Lemma 2, which also is provided in Appendix.
Lemma 2 characterizes (pRn1(q), p
R
n2(q), p
R
r2(q)), the optimal two-stage pricing decisions as functions
of q, given that the Remanufacturing strategy is implemented, as well as (dRn1(q), d
R
n2(q), d
R
r2(q)), the
corresponding optimal demands. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the Remanufacturing strategy is implemented, then the optimal two-stage prices
and demands, as functions of q, are such that:
i)
∂pRn2(q)
∂q ≥
(
∂pRn1(q)
∂q ,
∂pRr2(q)
∂q
)
> 0;
ii)
(
∂dRn2(q)
∂q ,
∂dRn1(q)
∂q
)
≤ 0, whereas ∂dRr2(q)∂q > 0 for q < q1 but
∂dRr2(q)
∂q < 0 for q > q1,
where q1 =
fnfr(fn−fr)
f2n(gn−gr)−(fn−fr)2gn denotes the quality threshold above which d
R
r2(q) = d
R
n1(q), but below
which dRr2(q) < d
R
n1(q).
Proposition 2 (i) shows that the prices for both new and remanufactured products increase in
quality, given that the Remanufacturing strategy is implemented. Moreover, the stage 2 new product
price increases faster than both the stage 1 new product price and the stage 2 remanufactured product
price. These are the effects of both cost saving and cannibalization. First, cost saving negatively affects
the stage 1 new product price because high cost saving warrants more used units to be re-collected for
remanufacturing purpose, whereas it does not directly affect the stage 2 new product price because
these products will not be remanufactured at the end of stage 2. Second, cannibalization positively
affects the stage 2 new product price because fewer new products mean consumers with higher valuation
are targeted, whereas it negatively affects the stage 2 remanufactured product price because more
remanufactured products mean consumers with higher valuation are targeted.
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As Proposition 2 also illustrates, if the Remanufacturing strategy is implemented, then the sales
volume of new products in both stage 1 and stage 2 decreases as quality increases. In contrast, the
corresponding sales volume of remanufactured products first increases and then decreases in q. Intu-
itively, when quality is sufficiently low (specifically, when q < q1), the firm does not remanufacture all
of the returned used products from stage 1. In that case, an increase in quality means larger cost sav-
ings from remanufacturing, hence the firm remanufactures more. However, when quality is sufficiently
high (specifically, when q > q1), the firm remanufactures all of the returned used products from stage
1. In that case, an increase in quality not only affects the profit of remanufactured products in stage 2,
but also that of new products in stage 1. And because the marginal value of remanufacturing a unit is
smaller than the marginal loss of producing a unit of new product, the firm remanufactures less. Given
(6), let ΠR(q) = ΠR(pRn1(q), p
R
n2(q), p
R
r2(q), q) denote the profit associated with the Remanufacturing
strategy, reduced to a function of q only. Lemma 3, also provided in Appendix, establishes that ΠR(q)
is continuous and unimodal in q. Maximizing ΠR(q) accordingly leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Remanufacturing Strategy). Let (qR∗, pR∗n1 , pR∗n2 , pR∗r2 ) denote the optimal de-
sign and pricing decisions given that dr2 > 0; and let d
R∗ and ΠR∗ denote the associated two-stage
total demand and profit, respectively. Then by definition kR∗ = 1, and
qR∗ =

qS =
fn+fr
3(gn+gr)
, 0 ≤ gr ≤ grS ;
qC =
f2n(gn+gr)+gn(f
2
n−f2r )
3(fng2n+frg
2
r+(fn−fr)(gn+gr)2)
(
2−
√
1− 3(f2n+fnfr−f2r )(frgn−fngr)2
(f2n(gn+gr)+gn(f
2
n−f2r ))2
)
, grS < gr ≤ grC
qP =
2fnfr(fn−fr)gn
3((frgn−fngr)2+2fr(fn−fr)g2n)
(
2−
√
1− 3(frgn−fngr)2
2fr(fn−fr)g2n
)
, grC < gr < grP ;
where grS =
frgn
fn
− 2(f2n−f2r )gnfn(3fn−2fr) , grC =
frgn
fn
− 4frgn(fn−fr)
2f2n+3fnfr−3f2r , and grP =
frgn
fn
. Accordingly, for j =
n1, n2, r2:
pR∗j d
R∗ ΠR∗
0 ≤ gr ≤ grS pRj (qS) 2dRn1(qS) ΠR(qS)
grS < gr ≤ grC pRj (qC) 2dRn1(qC) + dRn2(qC) ΠR(qC)
grC < gr < grP p
R
j (qP ) d
R
n1(qP ) + d
R
n2(qP ) + d
R
r2(qP ) Π
R(qP )
Note that grS < grC < grP . Thus, Proposition 3 characterizes the optimal remanufacturing quality
based on the remanufacturing cost gr, indicating that this quality increases as gr decreases, which is
intuitive. Accordingly, from Proposition 2, the prices increase, and, correspondingly, the sales volumes
of new products decrease while the sales volume of remanufactured products first increases and then
decreases. Notice also from Proposition 3 that if the Remanufacturing strategy is implemented, then
grC establishes the critical remanufacturing cost threshold below which the Complete Remanufacturing
substrategy is optimal (d∗r2 = d∗n1), and above which the Partial Remanufacturing substrategy is
optimal (0 < d∗r2 < d∗n1). Similarly, grS establishes the critical remanufacturing cost threshold below
which it is optimal to exclusively remanufacture all of the returned used products from stage 1 (d∗r2 =
d∗n1).
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3.4 Optimal Design for A Green Market
In this section, we compare the profit associated with the optimal Remanufacturing strategy (Propo-
sition 3) to the profit associated with the optimal Non-Remanufacturing strategy (Proposition 1) to
determine conditions for optimality. Specifically, we answer three questions: Given the market of green
consumers, when is it optimal to remanufacture? When is it optimal to remanufacture everything?
When is it optimal to design for remanufacturability but not to remanufacture?
In the context of our model, remanufacturing means that dr2 > 0 in an optimal solution. Thus,
to answer this question, we directly compare the profit associated with the optimal Remanufacturing
strategy (Proposition 3) to the profit associated with the optimal Non-Remanufacturing strategy
(Proposition 1). This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If gr/fr < gn/fn < fn, then it is optimal to remanufacture; that is, k
∗ = 1 and
d∗r2 > 0.
Proposition 4 provides a sufficient condition indicating when the Remanufacturing strategy in
Proposition 3 is optimal. Notice that this condition is two-fold: First, for remanufacturing to be
optimal, it must be worthwhile to produce a remanufacturable product in the first place (re: gn/fn <
fn). But that is not enough. Second, for remanufacturing to be optimal, it must also be worthwhile
to actually remanufacture the remanufacturable products (re: gr/fr < gn/fn). The first half of
this sufficient condition (gn/fn < fn) is equivalent to that in Proposition 1, thus indicating when
it is worthwhile to design for remanufacturability regardless of whether or not remanufacturing will
actually occur. For insight into the second half of the sufficient condition, we note that the ratio gi/fi
can be interpreted as a market cost efficiency ratio in the following sense: Consider a consumer of type
v. If that consumer were to purchase a new product with quality q, which would cost gnq
2 to produce,
then the corresponding consumer valuation would be fnvq. Thus, the cost per unit valuation of this
new product is gnq
2/(fnvq) = gnq/(fnv). Likewise, the cost per unit valuation of the corresponding
remanufactured product is grq/(frv). Therefore, Proposition 4 essentially indicates that it is optimal
to remanufacture if it is more cost efficient, as measured against market valuation, to remanufacture
a remanufacturable unit of quality q than it is to manufacture a remanufacturable unit of quality q
(i.e., if grq/(frv) < gnq/(fnv) or gr/fr < gn/fn). Note that this condition is consistent with those in
Atasu et al. (2008) and in Ferrer and Swaminathan (2010), both of which consider models of exogenous
quality for the special case in which fn = gn = 1. Thus, Proposition 4 validates our model and extends
their results to our case of endogenous quality.
In the context of our model, remanufacturing everything means that 0 < dr2 = dn1 in an optimal
solution. Thus, to answer this question, we again compare the profit associated with the optimal Re-
manufacturing strategy (Proposition 3) to the profit associated with the optimal Non-Remanufacturing
strategy (Proposition 1). This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If gr/fr ≤ grC/fr < gn/fn < fn, then it is optimal to remanufacture everything; that
is, d∗r2 = d∗n1 > 0.
Proposition 5 provides a sufficient condition indicating when remanufacturing all of the avail-
able supply of re-collected used products is optimal. Notice that, again, this condition is two-fold.
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Consistent with Proposition 4, for complete remanufacturing to be optimal, not only must it be
worthwhile to first produce remanufacturable products and then to sell remanufactured products (re:
gr/fr < gn/fn < fn), but also it must be worthwhile to remanufacture all of the used products
(re: gr ≤ grC). Intuitively, for complete remanufacturing to be optimal, the market cost efficiency
ratio of a remanufactured product must be sufficiently lower than that of a new product, namely
gr/fr ≤ grC/fr = gn/fn − 4gn(fn−fr)2f2n+3fnfr−3f2r < gn/fn. Otherwise, the potential cannibalization of new
product sales would dominate the potential benefits of selling a marginal unit of the products, in which
case the firm would be better served by not remanufacturing everything.
Propositions 4 and 5 describe scenarios under which remanufacturing is a profitable activity. Per-
haps not surprisingly, remanufacturing is profitable if the cost of doing so is advantageous with respect
to the market for remanufactured goods. More surprising is the lack of empirical analysis of the prof-
itability of remanufacturing operations. For instance, Seitz (2007) notes that organizations may not
analyze the economic costs and benefits of remanufacturing when it is not their core business, in which
case customer orientation might be the bigger justification. Our results suggest that the two dimen-
sions, cost advantage and customer orientation, work together to make remanufacturing profitable.
In the context of our model, designing for remanufacturability but not remanufacturing means
that k = 1 but dr2 = 0 in an optimal solution. Thus, to answer this question, first recall from Lemma
1 (in Appendix) that dr2 = 0 if and only if gn/fn ≤ gr/fr. Comparing this with Proposition 1 leads
to the following.
Proposition 6. If and only if gn/fn < min[fn, gr/fr], then it is optimal to design for remanufactura-
bility but not to remanufacture; that is, k∗ = 1 and d∗r2 = 0.
Thus, consistent with Proposition 4, Proposition 6 indicates that, if the market cost efficiency
ratio of a new remanufacturable product is lower than that of a remanufactured product (i.e., if
gn/fn ≤ gr/fr), then it is not worthwhile to remanufacture any units even though it is worthwhile
to design remanufacturable products to begin with (i.e., even though gn/fn < fn). Basically, under
these conditions, optimality dictates leveraging the valuation premium associated with the market’s
green consumerism, but then avoiding cannibalization by not remanufacturing any units to sell at
a discount. Thus, in markets where consumers value environmental attributes in a product (such
as remanufacturability) but do not value reused components (such as in remanufactured goods), the
ability to remanufacture itself may have adverse implications for the environment. This is in particular
an issue for remanufacturing practice because remanufactured products are often seen as lower-quality
relative to their new counterparts (Michaud and Llerena, 2011; Hazen et al., 2012).
3.5 Discussion on the Optimal Quality and Demand
Note that, by combining Proposition 1 with Propositions 4–6, we can write the optimal quality (de-
noted by q∗), given the condition that gn/fn < fn, as follows:
q∗ =
{
qR∗, if gr/fr < gn/fn;
qM = fn3gn , if gr/fr ≥ gn/fn.
(7)
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Figure 2: Illustration of optimal remanufacturing quality and demand
As a stepping stone to better understand the impact of endogenous quality in the context of our
model, particularly with regard to its effect on the optimal remanufacturability (k∗), we graphically
compare the optimal quality from (7) to qB = 1/3, which from Proposition 1, denotes the quality that
corresponds to the Baseline substrategy and, as such, represents the conditionally optimal quality
given that k = 0. Specifically, in Figure 2, we graph the ratio q∗/qB as a function of gr. In a similar
vein, we also graph in Figure 2 the ratio of the corresponding total demands (d∗n1 + d∗n2 + d∗r2)/dB
as well as the ratios of the corresponding new product demands (d∗n1 + d∗n2)/dB and remanufactured
product demands d∗r2/dB. In producing these graphs, we set fn = 1.2, fr = 0.8, and gn = 1.1.
These parameters serve as our illustrative and representative case for Figure 2, as well as for the
figures that follow unless otherwise stated. Examining first the graph of q∗/qB, we find that, as the
remanufacturing cost gr increases, the optimal quality decreases until it reaches its minimal level at
gr = grP . At this point, q
∗/qB = fn/gn; thus, q∗ > qB is assured if fn/gn > 1. Examining second
the graphs of (d∗n1 + d∗n2)/dB, d∗r2/dB and (d∗n1 + d∗n2 + d∗r2)/dB, we find that a smaller volume of new
products are sold when an optimal strategy is implemented than otherwise would be sold if k = 0,
which is intuitive. However, a (weakly) larger total volume of products are sold than otherwise would
be sold if k = 0. This thus reflects the conventional wisdom that a firm reaches a larger consumer
base when implementing a remanufacturing strategy (Souza, 2008).
4 ENVIRONMENTAL FRIENDLINESS
In this section, we address the extent to which remanufacturable products designed for a green market
are indeed environmentally friendly, given that they are optimal to produce. In other words, we assess
the environmental friendliness of k∗ = 1. To this end, we first define an environmental measure that
we refer to as environmental impact. We then apply this measure to assess the environmental impact
associated with the optimal strategy (q∗) discussed in Proposition 3, and we compare that to the
environmental impact associated with the Baseline substrategy (qB) discussed in Proposition 6, which
represents the conditionally optimal strategy given that k = 0. Specifically, we make comparisons
to assess when it is environmentally friendly to remanufacture. In this context, the lower is the
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environmental impact, the more environmentally friendly is the strategy.
To define environmental impact, we follow the leads of Atasu and Souza (2011) and Agrawal et al.
(2011) by adopting a single aggregated measure to represent the total resources acquired from, and
wastes discarded to, the environment during a product’s life cycle. In that vein, we assume that the
environmental impact of extracting the resources for manufacturing a product of quality q is epq, where
ep represents an environmental impact coefficient; and we similarly assume that the environmental
impact associated with consuming, remanufacturing (if applicable), and disposing the remains of a
product of quality q is euq, erq, and edq, respectively. In this context, we define environmental
impact to be linear in q, everything else being equal, to reflect the notion that quality is a one-
dimensional vertical measure of a product and, thus, higher quality typically represents the need for
larger quantities of virgin materials. Accordingly, for given quality q and remanufacturability k, the
environmental impact associated with stage 1 of our model is
∆1 = dn1epq + dn1euq + dn1(1− k)edq,
where dn1epq denotes the environmental impact caused by the extraction of resources required to
produce dn1 units of new product with quality q at the start of stage 1, dn1euq denotes the collateral
environmental impact associated with the consumption of those units, and dn1(1− k)edq denotes the
environmental impact caused by waste disposal if the used dn1 units are not re-collected at the end of
stage 1 (i.e., if k = 0). Analogously, the environmental damage associated with stage 2 of our model
is
∆2 = dn2epq + dr2erq + (dn1 − dr2)kedq + (dn2 + dr2)euq + (dn2 + dr2)edq,
where dn2epq denotes the environmental impact caused by the extraction of resources required to
produce dn2 units of new product with quality q at the start of stage 2, dr2erq and (dn1 − dr2)kedq
denote the associated impact at the start of stage 2 resulting from remanufacturing dr2 units and
disposing the remaining (dn1−dr2) units, respectively, if the used dn1 units are re-collected at the end
of stage 1 (i.e., if k = 1), (dn2 +dr2)euq denotes the total impact associated with stage 2 consumption,
and (dn2 + dr2)edq denotes the impact caused by waste disposal at the end of stage 2.
Given ∆1 and ∆2, the total environmental impact for the two stages, which we denote ∆(q), is
∆(q) = ∆1 + ∆2 = ((dn1 + dn2)e1 + dr2e2)q (8)
where e1 = ep + eu + ed and e2 = er + eu represent the per-unit environmental impact associated with
a new and a remanufactured product, respectively. Thus, e1 > e2 is always true by definition. An
example of such aggregated measures of environmental impact is the carbon footprint of a product,
which is calculated by considering the amount of greenhouse gases emitted during the life-cycle of the
product and converting to the equivalent CO2 emissions (for example kgCO2e). In that spirit, Table
2 provides a summary of e1 and e2 values derived for a sampling of products, taking kgCO2e as the
unit of measurement. It is interesting to note from Table 2 that e2/e1 has a wide spread of values
across the range [0, 1] based on the impacts in different stages (represented by ep, eu, er, and ed).
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Table 2: Environmental parameters examples
CO2e(kg/unit)
Product Type (Unit) ep er ed eu e1 e2 e2/e1
Paper (ton)a 955 680 553 118 1626 789 0.49
Tire (ton)b 3177 1977 34 14,100 17,311 16,077 0.93
Cartridge (per)c 3.97 1.8 0.0425 45 49.0125 46.8 0.95
Wood (ton)d 666 122 851 0 1517 122 0.08
iPad (per)f 115.2 14.4 0.0099 41.6 156.8099 56 0.36
a. 1 ton = 200,000 sheets. Assumes office printing. eu from hp.com (Hewlett Packard 2014); ep, er,
ed from DEFRA (DEFRA, 2014).
b. Assumes life of 30,000 miles. eu from http://shrinkthatfootprint.com/ (2014); ep, er, ed from
DEFRA (DEFRA, 2014).
c. Assumes one remanufacture cycle. 10,000 pages printed. eu from hp.com (Hewlett Packard, 2014);
ep, er, ed from DEFRA (DEFRA, 2014) assuming 1.25kg plastics per cartridge (ecycler.com, 2011).
d. Assumes no usage impacts. ep, er, ed from DEFRA (DEFRA, 2014).
f. ep, er, and eu from Apple (2012), ed from DEFRA (DEFRA, 2014).
Note that (8) reflects the fact that (1−k)dr2 = 0 because k = 0 requires that dr2 = 0 by definition.
Notice therefore that the waste resulting from the disposal of remanufactured products in stage 2 is
offset by the waste avoided by not having to dispose the remanufacturable products re-collected for
remanufacturing in stage 1. Thus, as (8) illustrates, what ultimately impacts the environment are
three factors: (i) what is produced (which is represented by product quality q), (ii) how much new is
produced (which is represented by dn1 + dn2), and (iii) how much used is remanufactured (which is
represented by dr2). Note that, as a result, the cannibalization of new products by remanufactured
products in stage 2 is a good thing from the standpoint of environmental friendliness, to the extent
that e2/fr < e1/fn. Note also that we write environmental impact ∆(q) as a function of q because
both (dn1 + dn2) and dr2 ultimately are functions of q as per Propositions 1 and 3.
Given (8), we begin our exploration by asking if it necessarily is environmentally friendly to re-
manufacture everything given that it is optimal to do so. To address this question, recall that, in the
context of our model, remanufacturing everything means that 0 < dr2 = dn1 in an optimal solution.
Thus, we compare ∆(q∗|(k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1)) to ∆(qB).
Proposition 7. If gr ≤ grC and gn/fn < min[fn, fn(2f
2
n+3fnfr−3f2r )
(2fn−fr)2(fn+fr)2 ((2fn−fr)+e2/e1fn)], then ∆(q∗) >
∆(qB).
Proposition 7 demonstrates that, indeed, it is not necessarily environmentally friendly to remanu-
facture even if it means remanufacturing everything. Surprisingly, but not entirely unexpectedly, this
would be the case if the production technology is especially cost efficient (in the sense that gn/fn is
relatively low). Intuitively, if the market cost efficiency ratio of a new remanufacturable product is
low, then it is optimal not only to remanufacture everything when gr ≤ grC , but also to set quality
relatively high. As a result, the associated environmental impact ends up greater than it otherwise
would be if k = 0.
This suggests that cost efficiency potentially affects the environment differently than it affects the
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Figure 3: Illustration of environmental impact for varying production cost parameters
firm. To the firm, cost efficiency translates into increased profit. To the environment, however, cost
efficiency translates into higher quality which in turn leads to greater environmental impact. Therefore,
although it is in the best interest of the firm to pursue such efficiencies, it is not particularly in the
best interest of the environmentalist for the firm to achieve such pursuits. This is yet another example
of Jevons paradox.
Proposition 7 suggests that cost efficiency of new remanufacturable products (i.e., low gn/fn)
potentially could result in negative consequences to the environment. However, these consequences
are driven by higher product quality rather than larger remanufacturing volume. In other words,
although remanufacturing everything may result in more negative consequences to the environment
than otherwise would result if the product were designed not to be remanufacturable in the first place
(Proposition 7), it turns out that remanufacturing available units generally is more environmentally
friendly than not remanufacturing available units if the product is designed to be remanufacturable.
Given that previous literature discussing the practical implications of closed-loop systems (e.g., Volokh
and Scarlett, 1997; Reich, 2004; Griff, 2003) warns that the environmental benefits of such practices
should not be taken for granted, highlighting the importance of product attributes in making this
determination, our results underscore this warning, and the sensitivity analysis that follows helps
illustrate it.
Through sensitivity analysis, we investigate the impact of production costs (gn and gr) and con-
sumer valuations (fn and fr) on the environmental friendliness of an optimal policy. Specifically, we
fix two of the four parameters while varying the other two, and we compare ∆(q∗), the environmental
impact associated with the optimal strategy, to ∆(qB), the environmental impact associated with the
conditionally optimally strategy given that k = 0. To present the results of these comparisons, given
Table 2, we set e2/e1 = 0.30 for illustrative purposes; however, we note that the graphs and discussions
that follow are representative of 0 ≤ e2/e1 < 1.
Figure 3 shows graphs of ∆(q∗)/∆(qB) as a function of remanufacturing cost gr for three different
new product production costs gn = 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4. In the figure, if ∆(q
∗)/∆(qB) > 1, then the
optimal strategy causes higher environmental impact than the baseline strategy. Given that, Figure
3 demonstrates that a reduction in the remanufacturing cost (gr) yields a decrease in environmen-
tal impact if gr > grC , but it yields an increase in environmental impact if gr ≤ grC . Intuitively,
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Figure 4: Illustration of environmental impact for representative valuation parameters
gr > grC means that partial (or) no remanufacturing is optimal. In this case, reducing the remanufac-
turing cost increases the volume of remanufacturing, which increases cannibalization of new products
(smaller dn2), thus reducing the impact on the environment. However, gr ≤ grC means complete
remanufacturing is optimal. In this case, further reductions in gr do not affect cannibalization because
all available units already are being remanufactured. Rather, such reductions in gr result in higher
quality, thus increasing the impact on the environment, potentially to the extent that complete reman-
ufacturing becomes less environmentally friendly than the Baseline strategy would otherwise dictate
(re: Proposition 7).
Figure 3 also illustrates that environmental impact increases as gn decreases. This observation
reflects two effects: First, a lower gn means a higher profit margin for new remanufacturable products.
Second, a lower gn also means a smaller relative cost difference between new and remanufactured
products, gn−gr. These two effects thus combine to make remanufacturing less attractive. Hence, the
firm manufactures more new products and remanufactures less used ones. As a result, cannibalization
decreases, thus increasing the impact on the environment.
In contrast, as illustrated by Figure 4, which provides graphs of ∆(q∗)/∆(qB) as a function of
gr for three values of fr (fr = 0.6, 0.8, and 0.9) and for three values of fn (fn = 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4),
environmental impact decreases as consumers’ willingness to pay for remanufactured products (fr)
increases, but it increases as consumers’ willingness to pay for new products (fn) increases. Intuitively,
as Figure 4 (a) reflects, the firm is more reluctant to remanufacture for lower fr. Thus, reductions
in fr decrease cannibalization, thus increasing the impact on the environment. Similarly, as Figure 4
(b) reflects, a higher fn translates not only into a greater reluctance to remanufacture but also into
a desire for higher quality. Hence, increases in fn decrease cannibalization and increase quality, thus
creating a reinforcing effect increasing the impact on the environment.
These results together suggest that inconsistency in consumers’ valuations between what can be
remanufactured relative to what has been remanufactured contributes to environmental impact. Ba-
sically, the bigger is the difference, (fn− fr), whether it is due to increases in fn or to decreases in fr,
the larger is the environmental impact that results from an optimal solution. In other words, although
valuing remanufactured products leads to smaller environmental impact, valuing remanufacturable
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products leads to greater environmental impact. These results also suggest that whether or not the
two bottom lines — profit and environment — align with each other depends on the specific type
of products. On the one hand, factors pertaining to remanufactured products yield the same effects
on both bottom lines. Increases in profit are achieved through remanufacturing more used products,
and the resulting strong cannibalization leads to less damage to the environment. On the other hand,
factors pertaining to new remanufacturable products may affect the firm and the environment dif-
ferently. This is because increases in profit are achieved through offering more new products and
remanufacturing less, and the weakened cannibalization leads to more damage to the environment.
5 EXTENSIONS
In §4, we demonstrated that higher product quality is one reason why the environmental impact
associated with a remanufacturable product, when such a design is optimal, could be larger than that
associated with a non-remanufacturable product, depending on the circumstances. Thus, as our first
extension, to test the extent to which this result depends on the endogeneity of quality in our model,
we revisit the comparison of environmental impact behind §4 but this time we assume exogenous
quality instead. Accordingly, for the purpose of this section, let ∆∗(q) denote the environmental
impact associated with the optimal two-stage pricing and‘ remanufacturability strategy for given q,
and let ∆B(q) denote the environmental impact associated with the conditionally optimal pricing
policy, given that k = 0, for given q.
Proposition 8. If gn/fn < 1 and gr/fr >
gn
fn
− 2e1(fn−fr)(fn−gn)fn(e1fr−e2fn) , then ∆∗(q) > ∆B(q) as long as
q < fnfr(fn−fr)
f2n(gn−gr)−(fn−fr)2gn .
As Proposition 8 demonstrates, even for an exogenous quality, it is not necessarily environmentally
friendly to remanufacture. In particular, remanufacturing leads to larger environmental impact if the
remanufacturing cost is sufficiently high. In this case, Proposition 8 dictates that the firm will design
for remanufacturability due to the low cost efficiency ratio for new remanufacturable products, but it
will not remanufacture enough due to the high cost efficiency ratio for the remanufactured products.
As a result, the level of cannibalization is not enough for the environment to benefit. If, however, the
firm does remanufacture enough of the re-collected units, which would be the case, for example, if the
remanufacturing cost saving is relatively high (i.e., if gr is relatively low), then it would be especially
environmentally friendly to remanufacture.
To graphically illustrate these effects, we plot, in Figure 5, graphs of environmental impact for
q = 1/3 (which corresponds to the conditionally optimal quality when k = 0) and q = fn/(3gn) =
.36 (which corresponds to the conditionally optimal quality when k = 1 but dr2 = 0), given the
representative case in which fn = 1.2, fr = 0.8, gn = 1.1, and e2/e1 = 0.30. We find that higher
quality generally results in higher environmental impact if gr is either large or small. However, we
also find that higher quality leads to lower environmental impact if gr is moderate. Intuitively, if gr is
moderate, then higher quality means that the firm remanufactures a higher percentage of re-collected
units due to the correspondingly smaller volume of new product sales. This increases cannibalization,
20
q= .33 q= .36
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
gr
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
D
*
HqLDBHqL
Figure 5: Illustration of environmental impact for exogenous quality
Table 3: Marginal effect of consumer valuation on environmental impact
θ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
α
0.1 0.08, 0.01 0.08, 0.01 0.17, 0.03 0.13, 0.08 0.12, 0.05
0.2 0.08, 0.01 0.15, 0.10 0.12, 0.06 0.11, 0.04 0.11, 0.03
0.3 0.13, 0.07 0.12, 0.05 0.11, 0.04 0.10, 0.03 0.10, 0.02
0.4 0.11, 0.04 0.10, 0.03 0.10, 0.02 0.10, 0.02 0.09, 0.00
0.5 0.10, 0.02 0.10, 0.02 0.09, 0.00 0.09, 0.00 0.09, 0.00
thus decreasing impact on the environment. These results suggest that quality and environmental
performance are dependent on each other and the two need to be managed together rather than in
isolation. This explains findings in empirical literature that suggests a strong link between quality and
environmental performance (e.g., Wiengarten and Pagell, 2012; Oakley, 1993). There is also evidence
that consumers’ willingness to pay for a product is dependent on environmental performance and
quality as interrelated factors (Jaffry et al., 2004), which is further supported by our analysis.
In §4, we also demonstrated that consumers who are green only to the extent that they value
the idea that a product can be remanufactured, but not to the extent that they particularly value a
product that has been remanufactured could lead to unintended consequences in the form of increased
environmental impact. Thus, as a natural extension, we explore the potential value of educating con-
sumers to be more green. Specifically, we focus on the question of what would be more environmentally
beneficial, a decrease in fn (i.e., a decrease in θ) or an increase in fr (i.e., a decrease in α). To this
end, we numerically evaluate changes to environmental impact relative to changes in θ and in α, given
that the optimal policy is implemented. Specifically, we set c1 = 0.2, c2 = 0.5, e1 = .5, and e2 = 0.15,
and we compute ∂∆(q
∗)
∂θ and
∂∆(q∗)
∂α for values of θ and α such that (θ, α) ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5},
where ∆(q) is defined by 8. Table 3 provides a matrix of results where each cell presents (∂∆(q
∗)
∂θ ,
∂∆(q∗)
∂α ) for specified values of θ and α. According to Table 3, increases in θ result in increases to
environmental impact regardless of the value of α. Similarly, increases in α result in increases in envi-
ronmental impact for most values of θ, although increases in α yield no effect to environmental impact
if both θ and α are relatively large. Thus, as a general rule, there is value (to the environmentalist)
in educating consumers to be less environmentally conscious (smaller θ) and more environmentally
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active (smaller α). In other words, it is in the environment’s better interest to have consumers not
necessarily value so highly that which can be remanufactured, but rather to value highly that which
has been remanufactured. Moreover, notice that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂θ >
∂∆(q∗)
∂α . Thus, if the choice must be made
between educating consumers against the ills of overvaluing that which can be remanufactured and
the ills of undervaluing that which has been remanufactured, the environment would be better served
by investing in the former.
6 CONCLUSION
We have studied the quality design and environmental consequences of green consumerism, which is
characterized by higher consumer valuations for environmentally friendly features. In this context, a
firm has the option to design a non-remanufacturable or a remanufacturable product and to specify a
corresponding product quality, and these design choices affect both the consumer valuations and the
production costs associated with the product. On the consumer side, remanufacturable products are
valued more, but remanufactured products are valued less, than non-remanufacturable products are.
Analogously, on the cost side, remanufacturable products cost more to produce originally, but less to
remanufacture, than non-remanufacturable products do. Given this, we investigate the environmental
consequences of remanufacturing by first defining a measure of environmental impact that, ultimately,
is a function of what is produced and how much is produced, and then applying that measure to assess
the environmental impact associated with the firm’s optimal strategy relative to the environmental
impact associated with the firm’s otherwise optimal strategy if a non-remanufacturable product were
designed and produced.
Our results indicate that production efficiencies generally lead to profitability, which is consistent
with the remanufacturing literature, but it does not necessarily translate to environmentally friendli-
ness. Specifically, we find that if the production cost for each remanufacturable product is lower, then,
everything else being equal, the firm offers more new remanufacturable product and less remanufac-
tured products. Consequently, the larger total sales volume translates into increased damage on the
environment, which is consistent of Jevons paradox.
In a related vein, we find that the impacts of consumer preferences and production technology on
profitability align with those on environmental friendliness only when such impacts are manifested
through remanufactured products rather than through new remanufacturable products. On the val-
uation side, we find that if green consumers value a product that has been remanufactured, then the
resulting cannibalization will benefit the environment in the form of waste disposal reductions. How-
ever, if green consumers overvalue the idea that a product can be remanufactured, then the firm’s
optimal mix of new versus remanufactured products will not necessarily achieve the level of cannibal-
ization required to benefit the environment in the form of waste disposal reductions. Consequently,
under such circumstances, green consumerism produces a halo effect that translates into increased
harmful impact on the environment.
Extrapolating, these implications indicate that the interactions between product quality and en-
vironmental performance need to be investigated further. Much of the current thinking is centered
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around the idea that good quality will bring along environmental performance, however our findings
propose a richer relationship between the two. In turn, the potential adverse impact of green con-
sumerism on environmental performance has now been suggested both theoretically and empirically,
and awaits further confirmation. Indeed, echoing Atasu et al. (2008) and Seitz (2007), we note here
that more comprehensive empirical research regarding remanufacturable product cost structures also
is required. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the challenges inherent in collecting such accurate
data seem to stem from organizational uncertainty regarding economic valuation of remanufacturing
activities (Seitz, 2007) and mismanagement of remanufacturing operations (Guide et al., 2006).
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APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
As building blocks for proving Propositions 2–7, we first establish three lemmas. The proofs of Lemmas
1 and 2 are combined and follow the statement of Lemma 2. The proof of Lemma 3 directly follows its
statement. For Lemmas 1–3, let pRij(q), d
R
ij(q) denote the optimal Remanufacturing strategy price and
corresponding demand as a function of q for product i = n, r in stage j = 1, 2, respectively. Moreover,
let q1 =
fnfr(fn−fr)
f2n(gn−gr)−(fn−fr)2gn denote the quality threshold above which d
R
r2(q) = d
R
n1(q), q2 =
(f2n−f2r )
fngn−frgr
denote the quality threshold above which dRr2(q) = d
R
n1(q) and d
R
n2(q) = 0, and q3 =
(fn+fr)
(gn+gr)
denote the
quality threshold above which dRr2(q) = d
R
n1(q) = d
R
n2(q) = 0.
Lemma 1. If k = 1, then for given q < q3, dr2(q) > 0 if and only if gr/fr < gn/fn.
Lemma 2. If k = 1 and gr/fr < gn/fn, then q
R∗ < q3 and, for i = n, r and j = 1, 2, pRij(q), d
R
ij(q) are
as follows:
(i) for 0 < q < q1,
dRn1(q) =
fn − gnq
2fn
; dRn2(q) =
fn − fr − (gn − gr)q
2(fn − fr) ; d
R
r2(q) =
(frgn − fngr)q
2fr(fn − fr) ;
pRn1(q) = p
R
n2(q) =
(fn + gnq)q
2
; pRr2(q) =
q(fr + grq)
2
; (9)
(ii) for q1 ≤ q < q2,
dRn1(q) = d
R
r2(q) =
fn(fn − gnq) + (frgn − fngr)q
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
; dRn2(q) =
fn(fn − gnq)− fr(fr − grq)
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
;
pRn1(q) =
(fn(fn + gnq) + 2fr(fn − fr)− (frgn − fngr)q)fnq
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
; pRn2(q) =
(fn + gnq)q
2
;
pRr2(q) =
(fn(fn + gnq)− (fn − fr)(fn − fr − (gn + gr)q))frq
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
(10)
(iii) for q2 ≤ q < q3,
dRn1(q) = d
R
r2(q) =
fn + fr − (gn + gr)q
2(fn + fr)
; dRn2(q) = 0;
pRn1(q) =
fn
fr
pRr2(q) =
fnq(fn + fr + (gn + gr)q)
2(fn + fr)
; pRn2(q) = p
R
r2(q) + (fn − fr)q (11)
Proof of Lemmas 1–2: Here we prove our results using the lagrangian method. The corresponding
lagrangian of profit (6) for given q is
L(pn1, pn2, pr2) = (pn1 − gnq2 + λ)
(
1− pn1
fnq
)
+
(
1− pn2 − pr2
(fn − fr)q
)
(pn2 − gnq2 + µ)
+
(
pn2 − pr2
(fn − fr)q −
pr2
frq
)
(pr2 − grq2 − λ+ η)
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where λ, µ and η are lagrangian coefficients for conditions dr2 ≤ dn1, dn2 ≥ 0, and dr2 ≥ 0 respectively.
The corresponding KKT conditions are
∂L
∂pn1
= 1− pn1
fnq
− (pn1 − gnq
2 − λ)
fnq
= 0
∂L
∂pn2
= 1− pn2 − pr2
(fn − fr)q −
(pn2 − gnq2 + µ)
(fn − fr)q +
(pr2 − grq2 − λ+ η)
(fn − fr)q = 0
∂L
∂pr2
=
(pn2 − gnq2 + µ)
(fn − fr)q +
pn2 − pr2
(fn − fr)q −
pr2
frq
− fn(pr2 − grq
2 − λ+ η)
fr(fn − fr)q = 0
as well as the corresponding orthogonal conditions. The corresponding solutions are
pn1(q) =
(fn + gnq)q − λ
2
; dn1(q) =
(fn − gnq)q + λ
2fnq
;
pn2(q) =
(fn + gnq)q − µ
2
; dn2(q) =
(fn − fr)q − (gn − gr)q2 + µ+ λ− η
2(fn − fr)q ;
pr2(q) =
(fr + grq)q + λ− η
2
; dr2(q) =
(frgn − fngr)q2 − fnλ− frµ+ fnη
2fr(fn − fr)q
To prove Lemma 1, we first prove sufficient and then necessary conditions. To that end, we first
assume dr2(q) > 0 which implies η = 0. Thus
0 < dr2(q) =
(frgn − fngr)q2 − fnλ− frµ
2fr(fn − fr)q ⇒ frgn − fngr >
fnλ+ frµ
q2
≥ 0
which completes the sufficient condition.
Next, assume frgn > fngr, which implies q1 <
(fn−fr)
(gn−gr) < q2 <
fn
gn
< q3. We consider four cases
based on the multipliers λ and µ: (1) if µ > 0, then dn2(q) = 0, which implies dr2(q) =
(fr−grq)q+µ
2frq
> 0;
(2) λ = µ = 0, then dr2(q) >
fnη
2fr(fn−fr)q ≥ 0; (3) if λ > 0 and µ = 0, then dn1(q) = dr2(q) > 0, thereby
completing the proof of Lemma 1.
To prove Lemma 2, note that dr2(q) > 0 (by definition); thus, η = 0 and frgn > fngr (by Lemma
1). Accordingly,
0 ≤ dn1(q)− dr2(q) = q1 − q
2q1
+
(f2n + fnfr − f2r )λ
2fnfr(fn − fr)q +
µ
2(fn − fr)q (12)
Notice from (12) that dn1(q)− dr2(q) is decreasing in q. There are four possibilities.
Case I: If 0 < q < q1, then q <
fn−fr
gn−gr <
fn
gn
. Accordingly, dn1(q)−dr2(q) > (f
2
n+fnfr−f2r )λ
2fnfr(fn−fr)q +
µ
2(fn−fr)q ≥
0, and dn2(q) >
µ+λ
2(fn−fr)q ≥ 0. These inequalities imply that λ = 0 and µ = 0, respectively. Thus, the
KKT conditions above directly imply (9).
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Case II: If q1 ≤ q < q2, then
λ =
2fnfr(fn − fr)q
(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
(dn1(q)− dr2(q) + q − q1
2q1
)− fnfrµ
f2n + fr(fn − fr)
,
⇒ dn2(q) = fnfr(dn1(q)− dr2(q))
(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
+
(fngn − frgr)(q2 − q)
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
+
(fn + fr)µ
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))q
>
(fn + fr)µ
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))q
≥ 0
Thus, µ = 0 and correspondingly, λ = 2fnfr(fn−fr)q
(f2n+fr(fn−fr))(dn1(q) − dr2(q) +
q−q1
2q1
). Notice that if dn1(q) >
dr2(q), then λ > 0 which is a contradiction. Therefore, dn1(q) = dr2(q) and λ =
2fnfr(fn−fr)q
(f2n+fr(fn−fr))
q−q1
2q1
.
Correspondingly, the KKT conditions above directly imply (10).
Case III: If q2 ≤ q < q3, then q > fn−frgn−gr . Assume λ = 0. If λ = 0, then on the one hand, (12)
becomes 0 ≤ dn1(q)− dr2(q) = q1−q2q1 +
µ
2(fn−fr)q , which implies µ > 0. But if λ = 0, then on the other
hand, dn2(q) =
(gn−gr)
2(fn−fr)
(
fn−fr
gn−gr − q
)
+ µ2(fn−fr)q > 0 which, in turn, implies µ = 0, a contradiction.
Thus λ > 0, which implies dn1(q) = dr2(q). Correspondingly,
0 < λ =
fnfr(fn − fr)q
(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
(q − q1)
q1
− fnfrµ
f2n + fr(fn − fr)
µ =
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))qdn2(q) + (fngn − frgr)(q − q2)q
(fn + fr)
Notice that if dn2(q) > 0, then µ > 0, a contradiction. Therefore, dn2(q) = 0, and thus, µ =
(fngn−frgr)(q−q2)q
fn+fr
> 0. Correspondingly, the KKT conditions above directly imply (11).
Case IV: If q ≥ q3, then q > fngn . Accordingly, 0 ≤ dn1(q) < λ2fnq . This implies that λ > 0 and
dn1(q) = dr2(q). Similar to Case III, we also have µ > 0. Thus the KKT conditions again reduce
to (11). But notice that, given (11), q ≥ q3 implies that dn1(q) = dn2(q) = dr2(q) = 0. Thus,
qR∗ < q3.
Lemma 3. If k = 1 and gr/fr < gn/fn, then Π
R(q) is unimodal in q over q ∈ [0, q3).
Proof of Lemma 3: From Lemma 2 and equation (6), ΠR(q) reduces to
ΠR(q) =

ΠP (q) =
2q(fn − gnq)2
4fn
+
(frgn − fngr)2q3
4fnfr(fn − fr) q < q1
ΠC(q) =
(fn − gnq)2q
4fn
+
q(fn(fn − gnq) + (frgn − fngr)q)2
4fn(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
q1 ≤ q < q2
ΠS(q) =
q(fn + fr − (gn + gr)q)2
4(fn + fr)
q2 ≤ q < q3
(13)
Given (13), it is easy to establish that ΠR(q) is continuous and differentiable over [0, q3). To prove
Lemma 3, we show that ΠR(q) is unimodal over q ∈ [0, q3) if Πi(q) for i = P,C, S is such that ΠP (q)
is unimodal over (0, q1), ΠC(q) is unimodal over [q1, q2), and ΠS(q) is unimodal over [q2, q3).
Next, we establish that ΠP (q) is unimodal over (0, q1). To that end, we define the following
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notations:
γ =
fr
fn
;β =
gr
gn
; ai = i+
(γ − β)i
γ(1− γ) > i;⇒ a
′
i = −
i(γ − β)i−1
γ(1− γ) , i = 1, 2
Accordingly, we have q1 =
fn
gn
γ(1−γ)
γ(1−γ)+γ−β , which implies
fn
gn
= a1q1.
ΠP (q) ∝ 2f
2
n
g2n
q − 4fn
gn
q2 + q3a2
⇒ ∂ΠP (q)
∂q
∝ 2f
2
n
g2n
− 8fn
gn
q + 3a2q
2 = 3a2(q − qˆ−)(q − qˆ+)
where qˆ± = a1(4±
√
16−6a2)
3a2
q1. Notice, if 3a2 ≥ 8, then ∂ΠP (q)∂q > 0 over [0, q1), in which case ΠP (q) is
unimodal. Thus, consider if 3a2 < 8. Let H =
√
16− 6a2, and qˆ− = a1(4−H)3a2 q1 < qˆ+ =
a1(4+H)
3a2
q1.
Then to show that ΠP (q) is unimodal, it suffices to show that qˆ
+ ≥ q1. To that end, if qˆ− ≥ q1,
then qˆ+ > qˆ− ≥ q1. Otherwise, if qˆ− < q1, then H > 4a1−3a2a1 , or β > γ
(3γ−1)(2−γ)
2+3γ(1−γ) . In this case,
we have qˆ+ ≥ q1 ⇐⇒ K(β) = a1a2 4+H3 ≥ 1. Thus, to complete the proof that ΠP (q) is unimodal,
it suffices to show that minK(β) ≥ 1. We consider two cases. First, if 4a1 ≥ 3a2, then K(β) ≥
4a1
3a2
≥ 1. Next, if 4a1 < 3a2, then it suffices to show that (1) K(β) is unimodal in β, and (2)
min[K(βmax),K(βmin)] ≥ 1. To that end, we establish (2) first: K(βmax) = K(γ) = 1; if γ ≥ 1/3,
then K(βmin) = K(γ
(3γ−1)(2−γ)
2+3γ(1−γ) ) = 1; and if γ < 1/3, then
K(βmin) = K(0) ≥ 1⇐⇒ lim
β→0
H2 ≥ lim
β→0
(
3a2
a1
− 4)2
⇐⇒ lim
β→0
8a1 − 2a21 − 3a2 ≥ 0⇐⇒ lim
β→0
a1(5− 2a1) = a1 1− 3γ
1− γ ≥ 0
Finally, we establish that K(β) is, indeed, unimodal in β, thereby completing the proof that ΠP (q)
is unimodal over [0, q1). Let Z = K
a2
a1
. Hence, Z ′ = Z(K
′
K +X) and Z
′′ = (Z
′)2
Z +Z(
K′′
K − (K
′
K )
2 +X ′),
where X =
a′2
a2
− a′1a1 . Correspondingly, we have
3Z − 4 = H = √16− 6a2 > 0⇒ Z ′(3Z − 4) = −a′2 > 0
⇒Z ′′(3Z − 4) + 3(Z ′)2 = −a′′2
⇒ K
′′
K
∣∣∣∣
K′=0
= −a
′′
2 + Z(3Z − 4)X ′ + 2(3Z − 2) (Z
′)2
Z
Z(3Z − 4) < 0
This implies that K(β) is unimodal, thereby completing the proof that ΠP (q) is unimodal in q over
(0, q1).
Next, we follow a similar analysis to establish that ΠC(q) is unimodal in q over [q1, q2). Let
bi = 1 +
(1− γ + β)i
1 + γ(1− γ) ; b
′
i =
i(1− γ + β)(i−1)
1 + γ(1− γ) i = 0, 1, 2
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Note that b0 > b1 > b2. Accordingly, we have q2 =
fn
gn
1−γ2
1−βγ , which implies
fn
gn
= 1−βγ
1−γ2 q2.
ΠC(q) ∝ b0f
2
n
g2n
q − 2b1 fn
gn
q2 + b2q
3
⇒ ∂ΠC(q)
∂q
∝ b0f
2
n
g2n
− 4b1 fn
gn
q + 3b2q
2 = 3b2(q − qˆ−)(q − qˆ+)
where qˆ± ≡ 1−βγ
1−γ2
2b1−
√
4b21−3b0b2
3b2
q2. Notice that if 4b
2
1 ≤ 3b0b2, then ∂ΠC(q)∂q > 0 over [q1, q2), in
which case ΠC(q) is unimodal. Thus, consider if 4b
2
1 > 3b0b2. Let H =
√
4b21 − 3b0b2 > 0. Then,
to show that ΠC(q) is unimodal, it suffices to show that qˆ
+ ≥ q2. To that end, if qˆ− ≥ q2, then
qˆ+ > qˆ− ≥ q2. Otherwise, if qˆ− < q2, then H > 2b1 − 3b2 (1−γ
2)
(1−βγ) , or β >
3γ−2
3−2γ . In this case, we
have qˆ+ ≥ q2 ⇐⇒ K(β) = 1−βγ1−γ2 b0(2b1−H) ≥ 1. Thus, to complete the proof that ΠC(q) is unimodal,
it suffices to show that minK(β) ≥ 1. We consider two cases. First, if 2b1 ≥ 3b2 (1−γ
2)
(1−βγ) , then
K(β) ≥ 1−βγ
1−γ2
2b1
3b2
≥ 1. Next, if 2b1 < 3b2 (1−γ
2)
(1−βγ) , then it suffices to show that (1) K(β) is unimodal in
β, and (2) min[K(βmax),K(βmin)] ≥ 1. To that end, we establish (2) first: K(βmax) = K(γ) = 1; if
γ ≥ 2/3, then K(βmin) = K
(
3γ−2
3−2γ
)
= 1 + 2(4γ(1−γ)+(3γ−2))
10−17γ+8γ2 ≥ 1; and if γ < 2/3, then
K(βmin) = K(0) ≥ 1⇐⇒ H2 ≥ (3b2(1− γ2)− 2b1)2
⇐⇒b0 ≤ (1− γ2)(4b1 − 3(1− γ2)b2)⇐⇒ γ(1 + γ)(3γ − 2) ≤ 0⇐⇒ γ ≤ 2/3
Finally, we establish that K(β) is unimodal in β, thereby completing the proof that ΠC(q) is
unimodal over [q1, q2). Let Z ≡ (1−γ
2)K
(1−βγ) . Hence
Z′
Z =
K′
K +
γ
(1−βγ) . Correspondingly, we have
b2Z − 2b1 = H =
√
4b21 − 3b0b2 > 0
⇒Z
′
Z
=
2− (1− γ + β)Z
H
b′1 ⇒
K ′
K
=
2(1 + γ)− (1 + β)Z
(1− βγ)(b2Z − 2b1)
⇒ K
′′
K
∣∣∣∣
K′=0
= − (1 + γ)Z
(1− βγ)2(b2Z − 2b1) < 0
This implies that K(β) is unimodal, thereby completing the proof that ΠC(q) is unimodal over [q1, q2).
Next, to complete the proof of Lemma 2, we establish that ΠS(q) is unimodal in q over [q2, q3).
Accordingly, we have q3 =
fn
gn
(1+γ)
(1+β) , which implies
fn
gn
= (1+β)(1+γ)q3.
ΠS(q) ∝ (1 + γ)f
2
n
g2n
q − 2(1 + β)fn
gn
q2 +
(1 + β)2
(1 + γ)
q3
⇒ ∂ΠS(q)
∂q
∝ (1 + γ)f
2
n
g2n
− 4(1 + β)fn
gn
q + 3
(1 + β)2
(1 + γ)
q2 = 3
(1 + β)2
(1 + γ)
(q3
3
− q
)
(q3 − q)
Thus ∂ΠS(q)∂q > 0 for q <
q3
3 , and
∂ΠS(q)
∂q < 0 for
q3
3 < q < q3, which implies that ΠS(q) is unimodal in
q over [q2, q3), thereby completing the proof for Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 1, we know that gr/fr < gn/fn, and from Lemma 2, we
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know that prices and demands are defined over three segments: (0, q1), [q1, q2), and [q2, q3). We first
establish the continuity of both price and demand, and then we analyze the impact of q for each
segment. At q = q1, we have µ = 0 and limq→q−1 λ = 0 = limq→q+1 λ. Similarly, at q = q1, we have
limq→q−2 µ = 0 = limq→q+2 µ and limq→q−1 λ =
(frgn−fngr)(1−fr)(f2n−f2r )
[gn(fn+fr)−fr(gn+gr)]2 = limq→q+1 λ. Therefore, for
i = n1, n2, r2, pRi and d
R
i are continuous given the lagrange solution in the proof of Lemma 1–3.
Given the continuity of pRi (q) and d
R
i (q), we discuss the impact of q for each segment. First, for
q < q1, we have
∂pRn2(q)
∂q
=
∂pRn1(q)
∂q
=
(fn + 2gnq)
2
>
∂pRr2(q)
∂q
=
(fr + 2grq)
2
> 0;
∂dRn2(q)
∂q
= − (gn − gr)
2(fn − fr) < −
gn
2fn
=
∂dRn1(q)
∂q
< 0;
∂dRr2(q)
∂q
=
(frgn − fngr)
2fn(fn − fr) > 0.
Secondly, for q1 ≤ q < q2, we have
∂pRn2(q)
∂q
=
(fn + 2gnq)
2
>
∂pRn1(q)
∂q
=
fn[fn(fn + 2gnq) + 2(fn − fr)fr − 2(frgn − fngr)q]
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
> 0;
∂pRn2(q)
∂q
=
(fn + 2gnq)
2
>
∂pRr2(q)
∂q
=
fr[(fn − fr)(fr + 2(gn + gr)q) + fn(fr + 2gnq)]
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
> 0;
∂dRn1(q)
∂q
=
∂dRr2(q)
∂q
= −((fn − fr)gn + fngr)
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
< 0;
∂dRn2(q)
∂q
= − (fngn − frgr)
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
< 0.
Finally, for q2 ≤ q < q3, we have
∂pRn2(q)
∂q
=
fr(fn − fr) + 2(f2n + fr(gn + gr)q)
2(fn + fr)
>
∂pRn1(q)
∂q
=
fn
fr
∂pRr2(q)
∂q
=
fn((fn + fr) + 2(gn + gr)q)
2(fn + fr)
> 0
∂dRn1(q)
∂q
=
∂dRr2(q)
∂q
= − (gn + gr)
2(fn + fr)
< 0 =
∂dRn2(q)
∂q
Proof of Proposition 3: Given Lemma 3 and its proof, qR∗ = qS ≡ q33 if and only if qS ≥ q2, which
is equivalent to gr ≤ grS . Similarly, qR∗ = qC ≡ 2b1−
√
4b21−3b0b2
3b2
fn
gn
if and only if q1 ≤ qRC < q2, which
is equivalent to grS < gr ≤ grC . Finally, qR∗ = qRP ≡ 4−
√
16−6a2
3a2
fn
gn
if and only if qRP < q1, which is
equivalent to grC < gr <
frgn
fn
.
Proof of Proposition 4: Assume that gr/fr < gn/fn < fn. Then, two possibilities exist in an
optimal solution: either d∗r2 = 0 or d∗r2 > 0. If d∗r2 = 0, then k∗ = 1 by Proposition 1. If d∗r2 > 0, then
k∗ = 1 by definition. Thus, k∗ = 1 is always true. Given this, Lemma 1 implies d∗r2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5: As per the proof of Proposition 4, gn/fn < fn implies k
∗ = 1, and gr/fr <
gn/fn implies d
∗
r2 > 0 by Lemma 1. Given this, Proposition 3 applies, which indicates that gr ≤ grC
implies d∗r2 = d∗n1 > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 6: As per the proof of Proposition 4, gn/fn < fn implies k
∗ = 1. Moreover, by
Lemma 1, gr/fr ≥ gn/fn implies d∗r2 = 0. Thus gn/fn < min[fn, gr/fr] implies that {k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0}
is true. Next, to establish that gn/fn ≥ min[fn, gr/fr] implies that {k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0} is not true,
consider two cases: If gn/fn > gr/fr, then either gn/fn < fn, in which case d
∗
r2 6= 0 by Proposition 4, or
gn/fn ≥ fn, in which case k∗ 6= 1 by Proposition 1. Thus, gn/fn > gr/fr implies that {k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0}
is not true. Similarly, if gr/fr ≥ gn/fn ≥ fn, then either d∗r2 > 0 in which case d∗r2 6= 0, or d∗r2 = 0, in
which case k∗ = 0 by Proposition 1. Thus, again, {k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = 0} is not true.
Proof of Proposition 7: If gr ≤ grC and gnfn < min[fn,
fn(2f2n+3fnfr−3f2r )
(2fn−fr)2(fn+fr)2 ((2fn − fr) +
e2
e1
fn)], then
d∗r2 = d∗n1 by Proposition 5. Thus, to complete the proof, it suffices to show that (1) ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 =
d∗n1) decreases in gr, in which case ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1) ≥ ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1)|gr=grC ; and (2)
∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1)|gr=grC > ∆(qB). To prove (1), we establish that d∆(q
∗)
dgr
= ∂∆(q
∗)
∂gr
+ ∂∆(q
∗)
∂q∗
dq∗
dgr
<
0 by demonstrating that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂gr
< 0 and ∂∆(q
∗)
∂q∗
dq∗
dgr
< 0. First, to prove that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂gr
< 0, note that
grS < gr ≤ grC ⇒ ∂∆(q
∗)
∂gr
= − e1(fn−fr)+e2fn
2(f2n+fr(fn−fr))q
∗ < 0 and gr ≤ grS ⇒ ∂∆(q
∗)
∂gr
= − (e1+e2)q∗2(fn+fr) < 0.
Next, we prove that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂q∗
dq∗
dgr
< 0 by establishing that ∂∆(q
∗)
∂q∗ > 0 and
dq∗
dgr
< 0. If gr ≤ grS , then
∂∆(q∗)
∂q∗ = (e1 + e2)
(fn+fr)−2(gn+gr)q∗
2(fn+fr)
= (e1+e2)6 > 0 and
∂q∗
∂gr
= − fn+fr
3(gn+gr)2
< 0. If grS < gr ≤ grC , then
recall from the proof of Lemma 3 that q∗ = qC = fngn
b0
2b1+H
, where H =
√
4b21 − 3b0b2. Thus,
∂H
∂gr
=
(b0 − 1)(b1 + 3(γ − β))
gnH
> 0⇒ sign
{
∂q∗
∂gr
}
= sign
{
−
(
2
db1
dgr
+
∂H
∂gr
)}
< 0
Moreover,
∂∆(q∗)
∂q∗
= e1
fn(fn − 2gnq∗) + (fn − fr)(fn + fr − 2(gn + gr)q∗)
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
+ e2
f2n + 2(frgn − fngr − fngn)q
2(f2n + fr(fn − fr))
∝ e1 (2− γ
2)H − 2γ(γ − β)
2b1 +H
+ e2
H + 2(γ − β)
2b1 +H
≥ 0
where the inequality follows because gr > grS implies that β ≥
(
3γ−2
3−2γ
)+
, which in turn implies that
(2−γ2)H−2γ(γ−β) ≥ 2((3γ−2)+γ2(1−γ)(4−γ))
(3−2γ)(1+γ−γ2) ≥ 0 if γ ≥ 2/3, and (2−γ2)H−2γ(γ−β) ≥ 2γ
2(1−γ)
(1+γ−γ2) ≥ 0
if γ < 2/3. Thus, we conclude that d∆(q
∗)
dgr
< 0 for gr ≤ grC , which implies ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1) ≥
∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1)|gr=grC .
Finally, to complete the proof, we establish that ∆(q∗|k∗ = 1, d∗r2 = d∗n1)|gr=grC > ∆(qB) as follows.
At gr = grC ,
gn
fn
< fn(2f
2
n+3fnfr−3f2r )
(2fn−fr)2(fn+fr)2 ((2fn−fr)+
e2
e1
fn) implies that ∆(q
∗)|gr=grC = 2f
2
n(2f
2
n+3fnfr−3f2r )
9(2fn−fr)2(fn+fr)2gn
(e1(2fn − fr) + e2fn) > 2e19 = ∆(qB).
Proof of Proposition 8: To prove that ∆∗(q) = e1(dn1(q) + dn2(q))q + e2dr2(q)q > e1(1 − q)q =
∆B(q), it suffices to show that e1(dn1(q) + dn2(q)) + e2dr2(q) > e1(1 − q). If gn < fn, then, from
(4), ΠNR(q, k = 1) = q(fn−gnq)
2
2fn
> q(1−q)
2
2 = Π
NR(q, k = 0). Moreover, If, on one hand, gr ≥
max[gnfrfn ,
gnfr
fn
− 2e1(fn−fr)fr(fn−gn)fn(e1fr−e2fn) ], then ΠNR(q, k = 1) ≥ ΠR(q) by Lemma 1. Thus, in this case, the
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optimal remanufacturing strategy for given q is k(q) = 1 and dr2(q) = 0, and the corresponding optimal
pricing strategy implies, from (3), that e1(dn1(q)+dn2(q))+e2dr2(q) = e1(1− gnqfn )q > e1(1−q)q. If, on
the other hand, gnfrfn > gr >
gnfr
fn
− 2e1(fn−fr)fr(fn−gn)fn(e1fr−e2fn) , then ΠR(q) > ΠNR(q, k = 1) by Lemma 1. Thus,
in this case, the optimal remanufacturing strategy for a given q is k(q) = 1 and dr2(q) > 0, and the
corresponding optimal pricing strategy implies, from Lemma 2(i), that e1(dn1(q)+dn2(q))+e2dr2(q) >
e1(1− q).
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